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THE LIMITS OF MULTIPLE RIGHTS 
AND REMEDIES: 
A CALL FOR REVISITING THE LAW 
OF THE WORKPLACE 
Ann C. Hodges* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 initiated an era of expan-
sive legislative protection of individual employment rights. At the time 
of its passage, Title VII was much needed to address the widespread dis-
crimination and segregation in the workplace. While it has not been an 
unqualified success, the years since Title VII have seen obvious substan-
tial improvements in distribution of jobs on the basis of race, gender, and 
ethnicity, and a reduction in the earnings gap between whites and blacks 
and men and women. Equally obvious, Title VII has neither eliminated 
discrimination in the workplace nor has it resulted in complete equality. 1 
The fortieth anniversary of its passage is an appropriate time to reflect 
on the state of the law in the workplace and to consider where the law is 
and where it should be. 
* Professor of Law, University of Richmond. I am grateful for the valuable research assistance of 
Josh Laws and Rebecca Royals-Breland, Class of 2005 and Luke P. Wright, Class of 2006, Univer-
sity of Richmond. Many people over the years have contributed to my education about labor and 
employment issues - professors, workers, union leaders and members, attorneys, employers, NLRB 
and EEOC staff, and students. This article is a result of my interactions with all of them, yet the rec-
ommendations and whatever errors they contain are my own. 
1. Indeed, in speaking at a forum celebrating the fortieth anniversary of Title VII, longtime 
civil rights attorney Julius Chambers noted that plaintiffs continue to face the same problems that 
existed at the enactment of the statute when he commented there are is "no money, no lawyers, and 
no precedent to help them establish a violation." Appeals Court Judge, Rights Lawyers Recall Early 
Title Vil Years, Mixed Progress Record, 120 DAILY LAB. REP. A-5 (June 23, 2004). These same 
problems are highlighted infra and form part of the basis for my recommendation for reinvigoration 
of collective rights. 
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The decline of unionization, although largely unobserved in 1964, 
had already begun, and has since proceeded apace.2 As many scholars 
have pointed out, the focus of our system has shifted from collective 
workplace rights to individual workplace rights. 3 A greater number of 
potential legal claims are available to employees to enforce workplace 
protections, but far fewer employees are covered by collectively bar-
gained contracts that provide enforceable rights and benefits.4 Despite 
the proliferation of individual legal rights, the collective system remains, 
resulting in two parallel and often intersecting regimes for governing the 
workplace. Some labor law scholars wisely recognized the problems 
created by this shift in the legal regime years ago. Professor Clyde 
Summers cautioned that the expanding and sometimes cumulative rights 
would "hold out promises to the employee, harass and impoverish the 
employer, enrich the lawyers, and clog the legal machinery."5 Professor 
Katherine Van Wezel Stone argued that the overlapping systems endan-
ger both collective and individual rights, because labor law broadly pre-
empts state law rights and the decline of unions has reduced pressure to 
create, retain, and enforce individual rights.6 
It is never easy to reconcile varying schemes of state and federal 
regulation, but the workplace provides a particularly apt example of the 
difficulties inherent in patchwork regulation by state and federal statu-
tory and common law and, more importantly, the difficulties inherent in 
two different approaches to workplace rights, the collective and the indi-
vidual. The exponential increase in individual legal rights since 1964, 
when many of our civil rights became law, has compounded the problem 
of these dual systems. 7 The growth of alternative dispute resolution, 8 of-
ten unilaterally imposed by the employer, has added another layer of 
complication. It has been argued that section 301 preemption has had the 
effect of depriving unionized employees of "the benefit of the explosion 
of individual employee rights."9 More recently, the decision of the Na-
2. Clyde W. Summers, Labor law as the Century Turns: A Changing of the Guard, 67 NEB. 
L. REV. 7, 10 n.10 and corresponding text (1988); see Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The legacy of 
Industrial Pluralism: The Tension Between Individual Employment Rights and the New Deal Col-
lective Bargaining System, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 575, 578-79 (1992). 
3. Stone, supra note 2, at 584; see Summers, supra note 2, at 10. 
4. Summers, supra note 2, at 11; Stone, supra note 2, at 584. 
5. Summers, supra note 2, at 19. 
6. See Stone, supra note 2, at 635. 
7. Id. at 616. 
8. Id. at 633. 
9. Id. at 619-20. 
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tional Labor Relations Board in IBM Corp., '0 provided another view of 
the problem of intersecting rights. In IBM, the Board restricted the right 
of nonunion employees to have a coworker present at an investigatory 
interview that could reasonably result in disciplinary action, based on the 
potential of a contrary rule to interfere with the objective of eliminating 
workplace discrimination. 11 Analysis of this case suggests it is time to 
renew the call for a comprehensive reconsideration of the law in the 
workplace. 
Some might ask what relevance an NLRB decision has to Title VII? 
The answer is that the individual right to be free from discrimination 
granted by Title VII was used to restrict employee rights under section 7 
of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"). 12 Using the rights cre-
ated by one statute to limit the rights under another is problematic for all 
participants in the system of workplace regulation. 13 I do not suggest that 
Title VII was not necessary to redress widespread employment discrimi-
nation, nor do I question the need for continuing protection against dis-
crimination by employers and unions. I do urge, however, that we reex-
amine the current system to determine if it is working well for its 
constituencies (employees, employers, and unions), as well as society as 
a whole. 
There is some risk in challenging the status quo. We may end up 
with a system that is worse instead of better. It is a particularly risky 
gamble for workers and unions because their lobby is less powerful and 
their cause does not always draw strong support, even from those who 
would seem to benefit from increased protection. There is no guarantee 
that a revised system will provide workers a stronger voice in the work-
place than the current system. Nevertheless, it seems that a comprehen-
sive reconsideration of the law of the workplace is needed, because as 
Professor Summers predicted, the only beneficiaries of the current sys-
tem may be the lawyers. 
The IBM decision illustrates two major problems with current 
workplace regulation. First, there are two distinct but overlapping sys-
tems - the individual and the collective - which often collide. The result 
is, at best, an imperfect realization of rights under both systems, and 
perhaps more often, the sacrifice of rights under one to rights under the 
10. 341 N.L.R.B. 148, 2004 WL 1335742, at *I (2004). This right to representation during 
investigative interviews is known as a Weingarten right, named after the decision in which it was 
established, NLRB v. Weingarten, 420 U.S. 251 (1975). 
11. Id. 
12. Id. at 5. 
13. See generally, Stone, supra note 2, at 635. 
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other. Second, the multitude of forums available for litigation results in 
multiple claims arising out of the same action, as well as tribunals decid-
ing issues outside their expertise. After analyzing the IBM decision, I 
will consider the costs and benefits of the current regulatory system for 
employers and employees. Finally, I will make some broad suggestions 
for change, urging a revitalization of the collective system and creation 
of a system of labor courts to resolve workplace disputes. 
II. THE IBM CORP. DECISION 14 
The IBM decision dealt with an issue which has engaged the Board 
off and on for more than twenty years - whether the right to union repre-
sentation in investigatory interviews that could lead to discipline, 15 rec-
ognized by NLRB v. Weingarten, 16 applies in the nonunion workplace. 17 
The Board concluded, in this latest reconsideration of the issue, in a 3-2 
decision, that although application of the Weingarten right to nonunion 
employees is a permissible interpretation of the statute, policy considera-
tions weigh against such interpretation.18 Accordingly, the IBM decision 
reversed Epilepsy Foundation, 19 which four years earlier found em-
ployee rights to Weingarten representation in Section 7 of the statute. 20 
In introducing the policy considerations on which it relied, the Board 
majority in IBM noted that 
[t]he years after the issuance of Weingarten have seen a rise in the 
need for investigatory interviews, both in response to new statutes 
governing the workplace and as a response to new security concerns 
raised by terrorist attacks on our country. Employers face ever-
increasing requirements to conduct workplace investigations pursuant 
14. 341 N.L.R.B. 148, 2004 WL 1335742 (2004). 
15. Id. at *I. 
16. 420 U.S. 251, 251, 267 (1975). 
17. See Materials Research Corp .. 262 N.L.R.B. 1010, 1027 (1982) (holding that an unrepre-
sented employee has the right to co-worker representation at an investigatory interview that could 
reasonably lead to discipline); Sears, Roebuck & Co., 274 N.L.R.B. 230, 232 (1985) (holding that 
the NLRA does not provide Weingarten rights to nonunion employees); E. I. DuPont de Nemours, 
289 N.L.R.B. 627, 629-30 (1988) (holding that although the presence of a co-worker at an investi-
gatory interview might benefit both employer and employee, more powerful policy reasons dictated 
that Weingarten rights should not be available to nonunion employees); Epilepsy Found., 331 
N.L.R.B. 676, 698 (2000) (holding that nonunion employees have Weingarten rights to request co-
worker representation), enforced in relevant part, 268 F .3d I 095, 1105 (D.C. Cir. 200 I), overruled 
by IBM Corp., 2004 WL 1335742, at *l. 
18. IBM Corp., 2004 WL 1335742, at *I. 
19. 331 N.L.R.B. at676. 
20. Id. at 678. 
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to federal, state, and local laws, particularly laws addressing workplace 
discrimination and sexual harassment.21 
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The Board then set forth its supporting policy rationales, several of 
which focused on the inability of coworkers to serve the same purposes 
as a union representative.22 The rationale that most directly impacts the 
intersection of individual and collective rights, however, is that em-
ployer investigations conducted pursuant to laws designed to prevent 
harassment and create safe workplaces may be compromised by the 
presence of a coworker. 23 The court reasoned that a coworker is more 
likely to interfere with the effectiveness of the investigation than a union 
official, who owes duties to all bargaining unit members.24 While the 
majority recognized that under the Weingarten doctrine the employer 
could forgo the investigatory interview to avoid the confidentiality con-
cern, 25 it concluded that the employer might be faced with liability be-
cause of its failure to conduct a fair and full investigation.26 Thus, the 
majority concluded "that, on balance, the right of an employee to a co-
worker's presence in the absence of a union is outweighed by an em-
ployer's right to conduct prompt, efficient, thorough and confidential 
workplace investigations. ,m 
III. THE PROBLEMS ILLUSTRATED 
The IBM decision highlights two major problems with the current 
workplace regulation. First, the Board, which is charged with interpret-
ing and enforcing the NLRA, 28 evaluated the impact of rights under the 
NLRA on Title VII, an independent statute outside its expertise. 29 The 
problem with the availability of multiple forums for various claims that 
may intersect is that a tribunal may not accurately interpret laws that lie 
outside its jurisdiction. Even if the assessment of the law is accurate, the 
21. IBM Corp., 2004 WL 1335742, at *6. 
22. Id. at * 5-8. 
23. Id. at *8-9. 
24. Id. The majority recognized that the risk existed with respect to union officials as well but 
considered the risk to be lower. Id. 
25. Id. at *9. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. at* 10. 
28. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (2000). 
29. Although some Board members may have prior experience with Title VII issues, such 
expertise is not required. See id. § 153(a). 
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decisional body, at a minimum, may not evidence a nuanced understand-
ing of the legal implications of its interpretation.30 
In IBM, for example, one of the predominant concerns of the Board 
was confidentiality of investigations.31 The majority suggested that a 
right to coworker representation might discourage complaints by em-
ployees about coworker conduct, in addition to possibly interfering with 
employer investigations in two ways.32 First, the coworker's presence 
could inhibit the targeted employee from answering questions honestly, 
and second, the coworker might disclose to others information that could 
interfere with the employer's efforts to discover the truth.33 
Although confidentiality is a legitimate concern, the IBM decision 
failed to give sufficient weight to a number of other factors. First, only 
employees have section 7 rights, and under the NLRA, supervisors, 
managers and independent contractors are not considered employees, so 
investigations of workers in any of those positions would not be affected 
by the decision.34 Second, most employees do not report harassment.35 
The added impact of a right to coworker representation for an employee 
accused of harassment may, as a practical matter, have little impact on 
reporting. Third, the person under investigation can breach confidential-
ity as easily as a supporting coworker. The majority in IBM never con-
sidered whether safeguards could be put into place to minimize the po-
tential negative effects while preserving the employees' Section 7 rights. 
For example, the Board might have allowed the employer to impose con-
fidentiality obligations on the coworker representative or to limit the rep-
resentatives to coworkers not involved in the incident under investiga-
tion. 36 
30. While NLRB unfair labor practice decisions are appealable to the federal appellate courts 
(see id. § 160(f)), as are other federal employment law claims, the deference owed to the NLRB as 
an administrative agency may limit the appellate courts' abilities to logically accommodate both the 
NLRA and other federal employment statutes. See, e.g., NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, lnc., 
494 U.S. 775, 786-87 (1990); Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 466, 496-97 (1988); Chevron 
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Counsel, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). 
31. IBM Corp., 2004 WL 1335742, at *8. 
32. Id. at *9. 
33. Id. 
34. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3); see NLRB v. Bell-Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 289 (1974) (holding 
that "'managerial employees' are not covered by the [NLRA]"). 
35. See Mindy E. Bergman, et al., The (Un)reasonableness of Reporting: Antecedents and 
Consequences of Reporting Sexual Harassment, 87 J. OF APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 230, 237 (2002); 
Louise Fitzgerald, et al., Why Didn't She Just Report Him?: The Psychological and legal Implica-
tions of Women's Responses to Sexual Harassment, 51 J. Soc. ISSUES 117, 121 (1995); Sandy 
Welsh & James E. Gruber, Not Taking It Any More: Women Who Report or File Complaints of Sex-
ual Harassment, 36 CANADIAN REV. OF Soc. & ANTHROPOLOGY 559, 559-60 (1999). 
36. See Caesar's Palace, 336 N.L.R.B. 271, 272 (2002) (finding that where an employer im-
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To be fair, given the Board's limited authority, it may have been 
unable to envision an accommodation of these rights which it could im-
plement. If, for example, the employer's investigation was delayed or 
rendered less effective by its obligations under Section 7, the Board 
could offer employers no assurance that such factors would be taken into 
account in determining whether the employer's response to harassment 
was sufficiently prompt and effective to avoid liability.37 The potential 
impact of a requirement of coworker representation on an employer's 
defense in a sexual harassment case is a complex question that would not 
be easily determined by courts that regularly decide such cases, much 
less the Board, which regularly decides only cases under the NLRA. 
The broader point, however, is that the IBM decision, under the 
guise of protecting the confidentiality of harassment reporting proce-
dures, 38 took away the Section 7 rights of all employees to coworker rep-
resentation in investigatory interviews. 39 The real reason for the decision 
may be to protect the employer's ability to investigate, for purposes of 
eliminating and punishing problem employees and defending itself 
against harassment claims. But the fact remains that the individual right 
was used to limit the collective right, and overall, employees lost. The 
existence of a right to coworker representation in the nonunion work-
place is not well known and unlikely to discourage many reports of har-
assment, because in most cases nothing prohibits the harasser from dis-
closing information.40 Yet based on the limited potential for interference 
with employee reports of sexual harassment, all nonunion employees 
lost the right to representation at investigatory interviews as a result of 
the IBM decision. 
posed a confidentiality rule on each employee interviewed during an investigation of unlawful drug 
activity, section 8(a)(l) of the NLRA was not violated because the purpose of the rule was to protect 
witnesses, prevent the destruction of evidence, and preclude the manufacture of false testimony in a 
situation involving allegations of a cover-up and threats of retaliation and violence); see also Phoe-
nix Transit Sys., 337 N.L.R.B. 510 (2002) (finding that a rule prohibiting employees from discuss-
ing sexual harassment complaints among themselves was a violation of section 8(a)(l ), but suggest-
ing, based on Caesar's Palace, that such a rule could be justified where the need for confidentiality 
outweighed the section 7 rights). 
37. See Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) (establishing affirmative de-
fense to liability where supervisors engage in harassment). 
38. IBM Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. 148, 2004 WL 1335742, at *7-8 (2004). 
39. Id. at *10. 
40. Accused harassers might be reluctant to reveal information relating to the harassment due 
to embarrassment, but that certainly will not be true in every case. Under certain circumstances, the 
employer may be able to restrict discussion of an ongoing investigation into misconduct and such 
restrictions, where permissible, could be applied to both the alleged harasser and his co-worker rep-
resentative. See supra note 36. 
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This phenomenon has worked in reverse as well, in cases where 
collective rights have interfered with individual rights. In Emporium 
Capwell v. Western Addition Community Organization,41 the activity of 
two employees seeking to press the employer to end discrimination was 
found to be unprotected because the employees bypassed the union and 
tried to pressure the employer to deal with them directly.42 While the 
employees believed that they were taking the most effective route to 
combat race discrimination, they lost their jobs because they did not 
work through the chosen collective representative.43 Their individual 
rights to protest race discrimination were limited because they were part 
of a collective bargaining unit. Like IBM, this case protects the interests 
of the employer, here to be free from any economic pressure other than 
that of the chosen union representative. Neither the union nor the other 
employees objected to the protest activities. Rather, it was the employer 
who fired the employees and complained about being subjected to con-
flicting obligations - economic pressure to bargain with a group of em-
ployees who were not the certified bargaining representative. 
Employers also suffer under the present system. While it allows 
them to pit different employee rights against one another, often negating 
one in favor of another as in IBM, employers do face conflicting obliga-
tions under various statutes.44 In addition, employers may be required to 
defend employment actions in several different forums. 45 One conse-
quence of this phenomenon has been employer efforts to confine dis-
putes with employees to employer-created alternative dispute resolution 
procedures.46 While many employee advocates have decried this effort as 
interfering with employee access to the courts,47 others have suggested 
41. 420 U.S. 50 (1975). 
42. Id. at 65-70. 
43. Id. at 56. 
44. See, e.g., Ann C. Hodges, The Americans with Disabilities Act in the Unionized Work-
place, 48 MIAMI L. REV. 567, 603-08 (1994) (discussing conflicting obligations under the NLRA 
and the Americans with Disabilities Act). 
45. See Stephen F. Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the Millennium: A Historical Re-
view and Critical Assessment, 43 8.C. L. REV. 351, 398-99 (2002) (discussing the possibility of 
multiple claims when only one employee is fired); Summers, supra note 2, at 18-24. 
46. See Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109-10 (2001); Wright v. Universal Mar. 
Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 72-73 (1999); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 
(1991 ). 
47. For criticisms of employer mandated arbitration, see generally Cliff Palefsky, The Civil 
Rights Struggle Against Mandatory Arbitration - From "Separate But Equal" to "Just Another Fo-
rum, .. in DANIEL P. O'MEARA, ARBITRATION OF EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES 534 (2002); Sarah Ru-
dolph Cole, Incentives & Arbitration: The Case Against Enforcement of Executory Arbitration 
Agreements Between Employers and Employees, 64 UMKC L. REV. 449 (1996); Joseph R. Grodin, 
Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims: Doctrine and_ Policy in the Wake of Gilmer, 14 
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that the lower cost arbitral forum offers a better opportunity for some 
employees to obtain justice. 48 
IV. THE ENFORCEMENT PROBLEM 
Employees have more legal rights than ever before, yet data regard-
ing enforcement of those rights indicate that the rights are often more 
theoretical than real.49 The cost of litigating such claims is beyond the 
means of the average employee and an even greater hurdle for the dis-
charged employee with substantially reduced income.so Many attorneys 
charge several hundred dollars just for an initial consultation, a substan-
tial barrier for the low wage employee.s1 In addition, attorneys who work 
on a contingent fee arrangement will take only cases with a very strong 
chance of success and a relatively high potential recovery.s2 Because of 
the substantial cost of litigation, many aggrieved employees find it diffi-
cult to obtain legal counsel to enforce their rights. Only a small percent-
age of individuals seeking representation for employment claims actu-
ally obtain it. s3 
Government agencies do not adequately fill the enforcement gap. 
The agencies with employment law responsibilities have limited re-
sources. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), 
which enforces most of the federal employment discrimination statutes, 
HOFSTRA LAB. L. J. I (1996); David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: 
Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33 
(1997); Jean R. Stemlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's Prefer-
ence for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L. Q. 637 (1996); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Manda-
tory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990's, 73 
DENY. U. L. REV. 1017 (1996). 
48. Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate over Predispute 
Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO Sr. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 559, 561-63 (2001); 
Theodore J. St. Antoine, The Changing Role of labor Arbitration, 76 IND. L. J. 83, 91-93 (2001). 
49. See Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights, 30 
COLUM. HUM. Rrs. L. REV. 29, 29-30 (1998). 
50. Id. at 56 (stating that "the cost of litigating an employment dispute is at least $I 0,000, 
even if the case is resolved without trial. If a trial is required, the cost increases to at least 
$50,000."). 
51. Id. at 57. 
52. Id. (citing study that revealed that lawyers representing plaintiffs generally refused to 
handle cases without a potential recovery of at least $60,000 in damages in order to insure adequate 
compensation for their time and expenses). 
53. See id. at 58 (reporting testimony of Paul Tobias, founder of the National Employment 
Lawyers Association, that 95% of employees that seek assistance from private attorneys for em-
ployment law claims do not obtain counsel); see also St. Antoine, supra note 48, at 91 (noting that 
one plaintiff's attorney kept records revealing that he agreed to represent one of every eighty-seven 
potential clients who contacted him). 
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received 81,293 charges from private sector employees in fiscal year 
200354 and filed or participated in 393 lawsuits.55 The agency obtained 
benefits for another 13,533 employees in the administrative process.56 
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA"), which 
administers the Occupational Safety and Health Act, conducted 39,817 
workplace inspections in fiscal year 2003.57 Although that number may 
sound high, considering that OSHA is responsible for monitoring seven 
million workplaces, the inspections are clearly inadequate. 58 
While legal aid organizations handle some employment claims for 
low-income clients, these claims are a small percentage of the caseload, 
and consist primarily of income maintenance cases like unemployment 
compensation claims. 59 Some national public interest organizations also 
handle employment litigation, although the amount and type varies sig-
nificantly among such organizations. 60 These organizations tend to focus 
on high visibility issues such as discrimination and litigate a small num-
ber of cases that are likely to be influential.61 Professor Jolls, who has re-
searched the role of public interest organizations in employment law en-
forcement, concludes that neither the legal services organizations, nor 
the national public interest organizations "succeed very well in meeting 
the full set of employees' needs for legal representation."62 Difficulties 
in obtaining legal representation disadvantage employees attempting to 
enforce legal rights. Empirical evidence demonstrates that individuals 
54. EEOC, Charge Statistics FY 1992 Through FY 2003, at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/charges.html (last modified January 27, 2005). 
55. EEOC, EEOC Litigation Statistics FY 1992 Through FY 2003, at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/litigation.html#fnl (last modified April 22, 2005). 
56. EEOC, All Statutes FY 1992 - FY 2003, at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/all.html (last modi-
fied January 27, 2005). This figure includes successful conciliations, settlements, and cases with-
drawn with some benefit to the charging party. 
57. Occupational Safety and Health Administration, U.S. Department of Labor, OSHA En-
forcement Remains Strong, Fair and Effective, ar 
http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/opa/OPA2003750.htm (November 18, 2003). 
58. Occupational Safety and Health Administration, U.S. Department of Labor, OSHA Fact 
Sheet, at http://www.osha-slc.gov/OshDoc/data_General_Facts/factsheet-inspections.pdf, 
(last visited May 13, 2005). 
59. CHRISTINE JOLLS, THE ROLE AND THE FUNCTIONING OF PUBLIC-INTEREST LEGAL 
ORGANIZATIONS IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE EMPLOYMENT LAWS 16 (Harvard Public Law 
Working Paper No. 105), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=574806 (May 18, 2004). 
60. See generally id. at 1 1-15. 
61. Id. at 25. 
62. Id. Professor Jolls attributes the limitations of these organizations in part to the amount 
and sources of funding. Id. 
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without counsel are less likely to prevail when their employer has legal 
representation. 63 
In some cases unions may either litigate or finance litigation of 
statutory claims on behalf of employees.64 However, where the union is 
trying to organize the employees, several federal appellate courts have 
recently found a union's provision of legal services to employees to be 
an unlawful pre-election benefit which warrants setting aside representa-
tion elections won by unions.65 Where the union is already the majority 
representative, however, it can assist employees in enforcing their rights. 
Unions brought over one-third of the cases litigated under the Worker 
Adjustment and Retraining and Notification Act ("W ARN")66 a signifi-
cant number since unions represent less than 10% of the private sector 
work force. 67 While unions can provide significant enforcement assis-
tance, employees without union representation in this era of declining 
unions have extremely limited enforcement options and resources. 
Employees' claims are often unsuccessful, even when they are able 
to obtain expensive and often elusive legal representation. In general, in-
dividual plaintiffs fare worse in litigation than corporate plaintiffs.68 Em-
63. See Richard N. Block & Jack Stieber, The Impact of Attorneys and Arbitrators on Arbitra-
tion Awards, 40 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 543, 548, 553 (1987) (study conducted shows odds of 
winning an arbitration were the same where both parties or neither party were represented, but 
where one party was represented and the other was not, the party with legal representation was more 
likely to prevail); Ann C. Hodges, The ?reclusive Effect of Unemployment Compensation Determi-
nations in Subsequent Litigation: A Federal Solution, 38 WAYNE L. REV. 1803, 1830 n.138 (1992) 
(citing a study demonstrating that employees had a 30% chance of obtaining unemployment com-
pensation benefits when unrepresented and the employer had an attorney, but a 50% chance when 
both parties had legal representation); Rick McHugh, Lay Representation in Unemployment Insur-
ance Hearings: Some Strategies for Change, 16 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 865, 866 (1983) (citing a 
1979 study by the National Commission on Unemployment Compensation demonstrating that rep-
resented employees were more likely to obtain benefits). 
64. See generally Michael Carlin, Note, Are Union-Financed Legal Services Provided Prior 
to a Representation Election an Impermissible Grant of Benefit?: An Analysis of Nestle, Novotel, 
and Freund, 79 N. C. L. REV. 551 (2001). 
65. See, e.g., Freund Baking Co. v. NLRB, 165 F.3d 928, 935 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Nestle lee 
Cream Co. v. NLRB, 46 F.3d 578, 579 (9th Cir. 1995). Although the NLRB did not agree, the 
Freund decision renders the Board's position permitting such assistance futile. See Catherine L. 
Fisk, Union Lawyers and Employment Law, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 57, 60-61 (2002) (ar-
guing in favor of the Board position). 
66. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 (2000). WARN does not grant enforcement authority to any 
governmental entity or agency. See id.§ 2104. 
67. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, News: Union Members Summary, 
at www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm (January 27, 2005) ("About 36 percent of government 
workers were union members in 2004, compared with about 8 percent of workers in private-sector 
industries."). 
68. Theodore Eisenberg & Henry S. Farber, The Litigious Plaintiff Hypothesis: Case Selec-
tion and Resolution, 28 RAND J. OF ECON. S92, Sl08 (1997). 
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pirical studies of employment law claims show that plaintiffs have lim-
ited success at every level of the process. 69 Plaintiffs in employment law 
cases have a lower success rate than those in insurance cases and per-
sonal injury cases at all levels, including those tried before administra-
tive agencies, juries and judges, and those disposed of by pretrial mo-
tion.70 Plaintiffs' victories in employment discrimination cases are 
reversed far more often on appeal than those of defendants, a discrep-
ancy that far exceeds cases in other areas of law.71 Data also indicate that 
lower paid employees are less successful than higher paid employees 
both in litigation and arbitration, and that lower paid employees have 
less access to courts. 72 While employees have obtained high jury awards, 
most victorious employees recover relatively small ones.73 Further, a 
study of California jury verdicts revealed that women and nonwhites fare 
worse than other plaintiffs in both wrongful discharge cases and em-
ployment discrimination cases. 74 These data reveal that not only do those 
who have more resources fare better than those with fewer resources, but 
also that plaintiffs in employment cases do not succeed at the same rate 
as plaintiffs in the legal system as a whole, a result that is not likely at-
tributable purely to differences in available resources. 
Supporters of the current system argue that the threat of large jury 
verdicts and the potential for class action suits causes employers to com-
ply with legal obligations, even though many employees may be unable 
to successfully vindicate their rights. Certainly large damage recoveries 
exist, as do large settlements, particularly in class action cases, 75 where 
69. See Michael Selmi, Why are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. 
L. REV. 555, 559 (2001). 
70. Id. at 559-60. Plaintiffs in ADA cases have a particularly difficult time prevailing. Id. at 
561 (citing studies by Ruth Colker and the ABA). Indeed, employment discrimination plaintiffs in 
federal court are less successful than plaintiffs in almost every other category of civil case. Kevin 
M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in Federal 
Court, l J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES 429, 452, 455 (2004). 
71. Clermont & Schwab, supra note 70, at 450-51. 
72. THEODORE EISENBERG & ELIZABETH HILL, EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION AND 
LITIGATION: AN EMPIRICAL COMPARISON 10, 13-14 (N.Y.U. Sch. Law, Pub. L. & Legal Theory 
Research Paper Series No. 65, 2003). 
73. See )AMES N. DERTOUZOS, ET AL., THE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF 
WRONGFUL TERMINATION 44 (1988) (finding in a study of California jury verdicts in the 1980s that 
although the average jury award in employee suits was $650,000, the median employee received 
only about $30,000 after post-trial reductions in awards and payment of costs and fees). 
74. David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Verdicts Matter: An Empirical Study of California Em-
ployment Discrimination and Wrongful Discharge Jury Verdicts Reveals Low Success Rates for 
Women and Minorities, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 511, 548-49, 552 (2003). 
75. See, e.g., Zolnick v. Graphic Packaging Corp., No. OO-CV-1800 (D. Colo. Sept. 9, 2004) 
Gury award of$8,006,000 for disability discrimination, reduced by the court to $1 million); Latino 
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the attendant publicity may result in legal compliance or early settlement 
of meritorious cases. However, employer responses to such actions are 
not limited to compliance with the law. Pressure is mounting for class 
action "reform" based on business complaints that class actions are used 
to extract settlements unrelated to the merits of claims.76 Many employ-
ers are using arbitration to limit class actions,77 which further impairs the 
legal rights of employees, particularly those with smaller claims that are 
unlikely to be economically viable as individual claims in arbitration.78 
Moreover, a Rand Corporation study found that the legal costs of being 
sued for wrongful termination are only about .1 % of labor costs (or $100 
per termination), but that employers have responded to this potential li-
ability as if labor were more expensive.79 The non-legal costs are as 
much as one hundred times greater than the legal costs.80 Accordingly, 
the potential legal claims may reduce employment opportunities far in 
excess of their cost to employers or value to employees.81 
Officers Ass'n of New York, Inc. v. City of New York, No. 99-9568, 2004 WL 2066605, at *3 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) ($24,800,000 settlement in class race discrimination suit); see also Jones v. R.R. 
Donnelley & Sons, No. 96 C 7717, 2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis 1316, at *3 (N.D. Ill. 2005) ($15,000,000 
settlement approved by court in class race discrimination suit). 
76. See Philip C. Patterson & Jennifer M. Philpott, Note, In Search of a Smoking Gun: A 
Comparison of Public Entity Tobacco and Gun Litigation, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 549, 551 (2000). 
77. See Attorney Urges Employers to Adopt Mandatory Programs as Risk Management Tools, 
17 INDIVIDUAL EMP. RTS. NEWSL. No. 11 (May 29, 2001) (noting that "major advantages of man-
datory arbitration ... are to limit damages and eliminate class actions"); Paul E. Starkman, Open 
Issues After Circuit City: Still No Easy Answers on Mandatory Arbitration. 27 EMP. REL. L.J. 69, 76 
(2002) (indicating that arbitration can prevent class actions, the "bane of employers"); Jean 
Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the Class Action Sur-
vive?, 42 WM. & MARYL. REV. I, 5-6, 8-9 (2000). 
78. See Deposit Guar. Nat'I Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 336, 339 (1980); Eisen v. Carlisle, 417 
U.S. 156, 161 (1974) (stating that "[e]conomic reality dictates that petitioflS!r's suit proceed as a 
class action or not at all"). It has been argued that one purpose of class actions is to enable plaintiffs 
to bring claims that would otherwise be economically impractical to litigate. HERBERT 8. NEWBERG 
& ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS§ I :6, at 26; see, e.g.. Cruz v. Abbey, 778 F. Supp. 
605, 612 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (claims for compensation for lack of required notice of plant closing un-
der WARN where court noted in decision certifying class that many individuals would be unlikely 
to pursue claims in the absence of class certification); Bailey v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., 145 Lab. 
Cases (CCH) 54,031, 54,035, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14866 (2002) (claim for overtime pay under 
the Fair Labor Standards Act). 
79. JAMES N. DERTOUZOS & LYNN A. KAROLY, LABOR MARKET RESPONSES TO EMPLOYER 
LIABILITY 63 ( 1992). An empirical study of wrongful termination claims found employer attorney 
fees for defending claims to be rising substantially. DERTOUZOS, ET AL., supra note 73, at 45 (1988) 
(finding annual increases from 15% to 24%). 
80. DERTOUZOS & KAROLY, supra note 79, at 63. 
81. The same Rand Study also found that employment levels dropped in the states adopting 
the most employee-favorable exceptions to the doctrine of employment at will. Id. at 51, 52, 62. 
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Thus, the current picture of employment regulation is not a pretty 
one. Employees have many legal rights, but the great difficulty employ-
ees have enforcing these rights penalizes employers who comply volun-
tarily with the law and must compete with those who ignore it. In some 
cases, rights under one law are negated by another. Employers are faced 
· with myriad and sometimes conflicting legal obligations, imposing sub-
stantial cost and encouraging employers to relocate to countries where 
operations are less expensive. Unions represent a shrinking percentage 
of the work force, and as a result, their power to aid those workers that 
they still represent has been weakened. Clearly the current system, while 
benefiting a few, is not working well for any group as a whole, except 
perhaps the lawyers. 
V. RE-EMPHASIS ON COLLECTIVE RIGHTS 
While the collective system is the older and perhaps more outdated 
of the two intertwined regulatory systems currently in effect, I suggest 
that an updated system of collective representation is better suited to our 
current economy than the extensive individual rights system. Why ele-
vate collective rights over individual rights? First, collective rights give 
more power to workers. As demonstrated supra, individual rights with-
out collective enforcement are often hollow. Moreover, a higher rate of 
unionization is associated with greater individual legal rights.82 Second, 
a system of collectively negotiated benefits offers more flexibility to 
employers than mandated legal rights applicable to all. And third, a col-
lective system provides a democratic experience for workers and re-
quires them to interact with one another creating a more communal sys-
tem which benefits all of society. Thus, a reinvigorated collective system 
will benefit all participants in the workplace. I will treat each of these 
arguments for the collective system in tum. 
A. Employee Empowerment 
As noted above, individual enforcement of legal claims is limited. 
The premise of the NLRA, that employees have more power as a group 
vis a vis their employers than they would have alone, 83 still holds true. 
82. See DERTOUZOS & KAROLY, supra note 79, at 23-25 (describing results of empirical 
analysis of state law exceptions to the doctrine of employment at will, and confirming that states 
with right to work laws and states with lower union membership are less likely to allow employees 
to sue employers at common law to challenge terminations). 
83. 29 u.s.c. § 151 (2000). 
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Unionized employees continue to have higher wages and benefits on av-
erage, and greater protection against arbitrary employer action.84 Legal 
class actions, a form of collective action, tend to enforce legal rights and 
bring about change more effectively than do individual cases.85 Exam-
ples abound of employees collectively pressuring employers to achieve 
change in the workplace. 86 The support of coworkers can make the dif-
ference for employees between pursuing claims or giving up.87 Collec-
tive action can spread the benefits among more workers, unlike the indi-
vidual rights system, which tends to reward the few who have the most 
resources, the greatest persistence, or the most favorable facts to support 
their legal claims. And most workers desire some form of collective rep-
resentation to provide a voice in the workplace.88 
84. See SAMUEL ESTREICHER & STEWART J. SCHWAB, FOUNDATIONS OF LABOR AND 
EMPLOYMENT LAW 65, 67 (2000) (discussing union wage premium); Mayer G. Freed & Daniel D. 
Polsby, Just Cause for Termination Rules and Economic Efficiency, 38 EMORY L. J. 1097, 1143 
(1989) (confirming that unionized employees enjoy higher wages and greater job security than non-
unionized counterparts). 
85. See Randy M. Mastro, The Myth of the litigation Explosion, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 199, 
206 (1991) (stating that "[i]n one [class action] suit, many wrongs can be righted that would likely 
never have been righted [in an individual action]"). 
86. See. e.g., Marion Crain, Between Feminism and Unionism: Working Class Women, Sex 
Equality, and labor Speech, 82 GEO. L.J. 1903, 1938-39 (1994) (describing instance where twenty 
seamstresses confronted their supervisor about harassment, causing him to leave the workplace and 
even the city without collecting his final paycheck); Bernice Lott & Lisa M. Rocchio, Standing Up, 
Talking Back, and Taking Charge: Strategies and Outcomes in Collective Action Against Sexual 
Harassment, in CAREER STRATEGIES FOR WOMEN IN ACADEME: ARMING ATHENA 249, 257-68 
(Lynn H. Collins, et al. eds., 1998) (detailing creation of an organization to combat harassment by 
faculty and students at the University of Rhode Island); Martha C. Nussbaum, The Modesty of Mrs. 
Bajaj: India's Problematic Route to Sexual Harassment law, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT LAW 633, 649-50 (describing women's collective response to employer harassment 
in India); Dorothy Roberts, The Collective Injury of Sexual Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT LAW 365, 3 77 (describing collective efforts of female electricians to address prob-
lems of pornography in the workplace ignored by their union); Yukiko Tsunoda, Sexual Harassment 
in Japan, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 618, 621-22 (describing women's forma-
tion of trade unions to combat sexual harassment in Japan) (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. 
Siegel eds., 2004); see also Regina Austin, Employer Abuse, Worker Resistance, and the Tort of 
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1, 25-29 (1988) (describing informal 
methods of collective resistance to employer oppression). 
87. See ELLEN BRAVO & ELLEN CASSEDY, THE 9 TO 5 GUIDE TO COMBATING SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT 81-87, 122-131 (1992); Joy A. Livingston, Responses to Sexual Harassment on the 
Job: legal. Organizational, and Individual Actions, 38 J. Soc. ISSUES 5, 18 (1982); GINNY 
NICARTHY, ET. AL., You DON'T HAVE TO TAKE IT!: A WOMAN'S GUIDE TO CONFRONTING 
EMOTIONAL ABUSE AT WORK 281-319 (Seal Press, 1993). 
88. See, e.g., Stephen F. Befort, A New Voice/or the Workplace: A Proposal/or an American 
Works Councils Act, 69 Mo. L. REV. 607, 607-610 (2004) (describing the results ofa survey con-
ducted by Freeman and Rogers that show that American workers want "more 'voice' in the work-
place"). 
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With respect to discrimination law, many scholars have recognized 
that much of today's discrimination results from workplace structures 
and policies rather than intentional ill will.89 Further, scholars are begin-
ning to recognize discrimination as a collective injury requiring a collec-
tive response and remedy .90 The discrimination laws,91 as they have been 
interpreted, are not well-suited to finding and remedying such collective 
discrimination.92 Negotiation and collective pressure are superior meth-
ods of addressing necessary structural changes in the workplace. If the 
law were to facilitate collective action as opposed to individual law suits, 
change might be forthcoming. Collective action, combined with mini-
mum labor standards, might better protect the rights of existing employ-
ees to be free from discrimination.93 Notably, the bulk of discrimination 
cases today involve claims of unlawful termination and harassment, in 
contrast to hiring claims that predominated in the early years of Title VII 
litigation.94 Negotiation of protections against unjust discipline95 and all 
forms of harassment would eliminate the need for discriminatorily disci-
plined or harassed employees to prove unlawful motive, often an insur-
mountable hurdle in discrimination cases. For example, the employee 
victimized by the equal opportunity harasser has no current claim under 
the discrimination laws because the harassment is not "based on sex."96 
89. See. e.g.. MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 178-84 
(describing the structuralist view of workplace discrimination); Susan Sturm, Second Generation 
Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, I OJ COLUM. L. REV. 458, 468-74 (2001 ). 
90. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, The Rights of Remedies: Collective Accountings for and Insuring 
Against the Harms of Sexual Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 247, 257-
61 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva 8. Siegel eds., 2004); Roberts, supra note 86, at 365-78; see 
also Sturm, supra note 89, at 530-35 (describing collective efforts of employee groups to address 
discrimination). 
91. The "discrimination laws" include Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and related 
state laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, religion, national origin, gender, age, dis-
ability and sexual orientation. 
92. See Sturm, supra note 89, at 475-77 (indicating that a problem-solving approach is supe-
rior to using litigation in a "rule-enforcement" approach for remedying "second-generation" dis-
crimination issues). 
93. See Crain, supra note 86, at 1938 (arguing that "[f]eminist strategies that place working 
class women at the center of the agenda would also favor collective action and non-litigation strate-
gies, which are likely to be quicker, less costly, and tend to have an empowering effect"); Nuss-
baum, supra note 86, at 633, 649-50 (suggesting collective action as a better approach than legal 
action to address sexual harassment in India); Resnik, supra note 90, at 258-61. 
94. John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimi-
nation litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 1015 (1991). 
95. Virtually all union contracts contain protection against unjust discipline. See LAURA J. 
COOPER ET AL., ADR IN THE WORKPLACE 258 (2000). 
96. See Charles R. Calleros, The Meaning of "Sex": Homosexual and Bisexual Harassment 
Under Title VII, 20 VT. L. REV. 55, 70-78 (1995) (noting that a person who directs invective at each 
2005] THE LIMITS OF MULTIPLE RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 617 
A workplace collective could negotiate protection from all workplace 
bullying, eliminating the need to prove the sex-based motivation in a Ti-
tle VII lawsuit.97 
Those aware of some labor unions' history of discrimination might 
be reluctant to rely on collective agreements for protection against dis-
crimination. The response to this reluctance is three-fold. First, a collec-
tive representation system need not look the same as the current system. 
While delineating the precise contours of such a system is beyond the 
scope of this essay, I would note that many scholars have proposed al-
ternative systems or elements of reform that are worthy of considera-
tion.98 Second, the collective organizations in a revitalized system might 
not even be similar to today's labor organizations,99 and labor organiza-
tions are necessarily becoming more inclusive. 100 Third, the shift to arbi-
employee is not guilty of harassment because of sex under Title VII because the behavior is not mo-
tivated by gender differences). 
97. See David C. Yamada, The Phenomenon of "Workplace Bullying" and the Need for 
Status-Blind Hostile Work Environment Protection, 88 GEO. L.J. 475 (2000). Yamada does note, 
however, that "[w]ith unionized workers comprising only fifteen percent of the American work-
force, it is sadly unrealistic to look to collective bargaining as the primary source of even the most 
minimal rights for most workers at present or in the near future." Id. at 535. 
98. See, e.g., CHARLES B. CRAVER, CAN UNIONS SURVIVE?: THE REJUVENATION OF THE 
AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT (1993); CYNTHIA ESTLUND, WORKING TOGETHER: How 
WORKPLACE BONDS STRENGTHEN A DIVERSE DEMOCRACY 162-76 (2003); CHARLES J. MORRIS, 
THE BLUE EAGLE AT WORK 184-230 (2005); PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE 
FUTURE OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW ( 1990); Befort, supra note 88, at 641-51; Befort, supra 
note 45, at 443-52; Samuel Estreicher, Freedom of Contract and labor law Reform: Opening up 
the Possibilities for Value-Added Unionism, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 827 (1996); Michael H. Gottesman, 
In Despair, Starting Over: Imagining a labor law for Unorganized Workers, 69 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 59 (I 993); Michael C. Harper, A Framework for the Rejuvenation of the American labor 
Movement, 76 IND. L.J. 103 (2001); Ann C. McGinley, Rethinking Civil Rights and Employment at 
Will: Toward a Coherent National Discharge Policy, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1443 (1996); The Dunlop 
Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Rights: Final Report, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) 
(The Dunlop Commission, appointed by the Secretary of Labor and the Secretary of Commerce in 
1993 to answer three questions regarding improvements to labor relations), January I 0, (1994) 
available at 
http://www.ilr.comell.edu/library/downloads/keyWorkplaceDocuments/DunlopCommissionFuture 
WorkerManagementFinalReport.pdf (last modified February 17, 2004); see also Marion Crain & 
Ken Matheny, labor's Identity Crisis, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1767, 1834-46 (2001) (urging that an af-
firmative legal duty to promote workplace equality be imposed on unions). 
99. See Sturm, supra note 89, at 530-35 (describing the role of existing unions and new forms 
of employee organizations in addressing systemic issues of workplace inequality); see also sources 
cited supra note 86 (detailing various formal and informal collective efforts to combat discrimina-
tion, some by creating new organizations). The collective organizations might not need to be major-
ity representatives of all employees. See MORRIS, supra note 98, at 173-83 (arguing that members 
only bargaining is permissible under the NLRA). 
100. See Crain & Matheny, supra note 98, at 1784-85, 1829-30 (describing the AFL-CIO's 
recent initiatives to appeal to women, people of color and immigrant workers, and to focus on social 
justice); Ruth Milkman & Kent Wong, Organizing Immigrant Workers: Case Studies from Southern 
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tration of statutory discrimination claims authorized by the Supreme 
Court is already severely limiting employee rights to litigate discrimina-
tion claims. 101 Building collective organizations, which can aid employ-
ees in bringing claims, can only assist employees in battling discrimina-
tion. 
B. Employer Flexibility 
It is difficult, if not impossible, to vary legal requirements based on 
the needs of each employer in the workplace. In today's rapidly chang-
ing economy, employers need flexibility in order to adjust to changes in 
the market. By working collectively, groups of workers can tailor wages, 
hours, benefits, and other conditions of employment to the needs of each 
particular workplace and allow for negotiated changes necessitated by 
changing conditions. Furthermore, employers and employees can create 
flexible internal workplace systems for dealing with discrimination and 
harassment. 102 Prior to the rise of individual rights, the determination of 
terms and conditions of employment in many workplaces was made 
through negotiations with the union. When unions were more prevalent, 
they had negotiating power that enabled them to represent employees ef-
fectively and obtain contracts enforceable through grievance and arbitra-
tion procedures. As unions have declined, however, it has become more 
difficult for those that remain to succeed in negotiating contracts with 
substantial benefits for employees. 
For a collective system to work effectively again, the legal frame-
work must be carefully drawn to ensure that the collectives of employees 
have sufficient power, 103 and the information necessary to deal with the 
employer on a level playing field. 104 This article will only outline a few 
California, in REKINDLING THE MOVEMENT: LABOR'S QUEST FOR RELEVANCE IN THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY 99, 99-128 (2001) (describing and analyzing successful and unsuccessful efforts to 
organize immigrant workers); Stone, supra note 2, at 581-82 (pointing out that unions have ap-
pealed to women and people of color). 
101. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 118-19 (2001); Gilmer v. Inter-
state/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24-35 (1991); see also supra notes 46-48 and accompanying 
text. 
102. See Sturm, supra note 89, at 491-520 (describing such systems in three different work-
places designed to address internal structural problems contributing to workplace inequality). 
103. Sham employee collectives without real participation or power will not accomplish the 
goals described herein. See CAROLE PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 68-69 
(1970) (indicating that to evaluate the value of worker participation for democracy, one must distin-
guish "pseudo-participation" from actual participation, partial or full); Sturm, supra note 89, at 490 
n.96 and accompanying text. 
104. See NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 153 (1956) (finding an employer duty to fur-
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essential parameters of a modified collective system, most of which exist 
in the current NLRA, but may require some modification to insure effec-
tive application. 105 The employees' collective activity must be clearly 
and unequivocally protected, with adequate remedies to address employ-
ers' violations. Perhaps most important, employees must be aware of 
their rights to act collectively even without a formal union. 106 
There must be mechanisms through which employees can select 
their representatives and resolve disputes where the parties are unable to 
agree, 107 and employees must be allowed to use some work time for col-
lective activity. Finally, there must be some minimum conditions, such 
as the existing minimum wage and provisions prohibiting discrimina-
tion, which set floors below which the parties cannot go in their negotia-
tions. Absent discrimination, however, the employees' collective repre-
sentative(s) and the employer should be free to agree to terms and condi-
tions of employment desired. 
Employer concerns about the cost of negotiations and the lost pro-
ductivity from employee participation in negotiations should be allevi-
ated by the reduced need for concerns about legal compliance and by 
greater flexibility. 108 In addition, evidence indicates that unionized work-
forces generally are more stable and more productive. 109 Many employ-
nish information to union where employer claims financial inability to pay union bargaining de-
mands); PATEMAN, supra note 103, at 69 (noting that effective employee participation cannot occur 
without the necessary information). 
I 05. Indeed, Professor William Corbett has suggested that the current NLRA provides many of 
the needed protections already and should be a vital part of the new vision for labor and employ-
ment law. William R. Corbett, Waiting for the labor law of the Twenty-First Century: Everything 
Old ls New Again, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 259, 277-78 (2002). He suggests that a broader 
interpretation of existing law would reinvigorate the statute and provide substantial protection for 
nonunion employees to engage in collective action. Id. at 298-301. One significant element of Pro-
fessor Corbett's argument is the holding in Epilepsy Found., 331 N.L.R.B. 676 (2000). Corbett, su-
pra, at 277-79. Epilepsy Found., of course, was reversed by IBM Corp .. 341 N.L.R.B. 148, 2004 
WL 1335742 (2004). 
106. A simple proposal for such notification is a requirement that employers post notices in the 
workplace regarding NLRA rights, a requirement that exists already under most federal employment 
statutes. See Corbett, supra note !05, at 297-98. 
107. Currently, economic action by both parties is permitted to break an impasse and to pres-
sure the other party to accede to proposed contractual terms. Many public sector collective bargain-
ing systems use arbitration or other alternative mechanisms such as mediation or fact-finding to re-
solve negotiation impasses. See JOSEPH R. GRODIN ET AL., PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 326-70 (2004). 
108. Employee participation in the workplace is consistent with economic efficiency. 
PATEMAN, supra note 103, at 83. 
109. See ESTREICHER & SCHWAB, supra note 84, at 69-84; see also PA TEMAN, supra note 103, 
at 62-66 (discussing consistent findings in empirical research on employee participation in the 
workplace that it is desired by employees and enhances job satisfaction with, at minimum, no loss 
of productive efficiency). 
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ers recognize the inherent value of workplace participation and inde-
pendently provide mechanisms for employees to participate. 110 Building 
on this trend, the collective system fostered by the law must insure that 
such participation is real and effective. The employer can then capture 
the productivity value desired and the flexibility offered, which should 
enable American business to compete more effectively in the global 
marketplace. 
C. Democratic Participation 
Last but not least, the workplace is widely viewed as a training 
ground for democratic participation. 111 One of the ascribed purposes of 
the NLRA was to bring democracy to the workplace. 112 Senator Wagner, 
the primary sponsor of the Act, relied on the vision of Louis Brandeis, 
who asserted the importance of workers' participation in the conduct of 
business as a "daily experience of 'responsibility' ... necessary to their 
'intellectual, moral and spiritual development' .... " 113 The NLRA, like 
the U.S. Constitution, gave workers a role in their self-government and a 
collective voice in their choice of a representative to deal with their em-
ployer. The alternative is either corporate or bureaucratic despotism, 
however benign. 114 While the vision of the NLRA's proponents has not 
been fully realized by the Act in practice, the importance of employee 
participation in workplace governance as vital in a democratic nation is 
still widely accepted. 115 Indeed, a strong independent labor movement 
110. See ESTREICHER & SCHWAB, supra note 84, at 58. 
111. PATEMAN, supra note 103, at 32-35 (discussing John Stuart Mill's theory of the educative 
function of participation). For a recent related empirical study, see Lisa Schur et al., High Involve-
ment Work Systems and Political Efficacy: A Tale of Two Departments, in INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
RESEARCH ASSOCIATION SERIES, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 56TH ANNUAL MEETING 9, 9-10 (Adrienne 
E. Eaton ed. 2004). 
112. Mark Barenberg, The Political Economy of the Wagner Act: Power, Symbol, and Work-
place Cooperation, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1379, 1423-27 (1993); Craig Becker, Democracy in the 
Workplace: Union Representation Elections and Federal Labor Law, 77 MINN. L. REV. 495, 502-
03 (1993). This goal was not exclusively related to the interests of the workers. Some thought that 
providing workers with a voice in the workplace would reduce chances of worker rebellion against 
the existing social order. James J. Brudney, A Famous Victory: Collective Bargaining Protections 
and the Statutory Aging Process, 74 N.C.L. REV. 939, 950 (1996). 
113. Barenberg, supra note 112, at 1426 (quoting PHILIPPA STRUM, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS 192 
(1984)). 
114. See id. at 1425; CHARLES HECKSCHER, THE NEW UNIONISM: EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT 
IN THE CHANGING CORPORATION 251-52 (1988). Heckscher notes that as unions have declined, the 
government has stepped in to regulate corporate activity directly. Id. 
115. See ESTLUNDsupra note 98, at 134-39; PATEMAN, supra note 103, at 83-84, 102, 105-06; 
James J. Brudney, Reflections on Group Action and the Law of the Workplace, 74 TEX. L. REV. 
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has been identified as essential to democracy. 116 The role of the Solidar-
ity labor movement in transforming Poland from a communist dictator-
ship to a democracy has been cited as evidence of the important role that 
the labor movement and its members can play in democracy. 117 
Cynthia Estlund has recently made a related argument - that the 
workplace "fosters social ties and civic skills that are essential in a di-
verse democratic society."118 She argues that the workplace is the locus 
of most intergroup relationships among the diverse membership in 
American society, and thus plays an important role in enabling individu-
als from different backgrounds to live together cooperatively in a de-
mocratic society. 119 Thus, she urges that the law encourage and protect 
collective action to foster the connections among diverse workers that 
are essential to American society. 120 
Robert Putnam documented the decline in social capital in Ameri-
can society in his classic study, Bowling Alone. 121 The term "social capi-
tal" refers to the connections among individuals that are essential in a 
civil society for creating norms, establishing community bonds, and in-
suring an efficient society. 122 Putnam identifies workplace organizations 
such as unions and professional associations as primary sources of "civic 
connectedness."123 The decline of unions, the limited growth of profes-
sional associations, and the growth of contingent work have reduced the 
importance of the workplace as a source of social capital, paralleling a 
general reduction in social capital in other parts of society.124 Encourag-
ing collective activity in the workplace could be one part of a strategy to 
encourage renewal of community bonds. 125 
1563, 1596 (1996); Paula B. Voos, Democracy and Industrial Relations, in INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
RESEARCH ASSOCIATION SERIES, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 56TH ANNUAL MEETING I, 1, 3 (Adrienne 
E. Eaton ed. 2004); Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization 
Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1822-23 (1983). 
116. Charles 8. Craver, The National labor Relations Act Must Be Revised to Preserve Indus-
trial Democracy, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 397, 417 (1992); Voos, supra note 115, at 3-4. 
117. For a discussion of the role of Solidarity in Poland's transformation, see Shannan C. 
Krasnokutski, Human Rights in Transition: The Success and Failure of Polish and Russian Crimi-
na/Justice Reform, 33 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 13, 19-23 (2001). 
118. ESTLUND, supra note 98, at 137. 
119. See id. at 3-20, 177-81. 
120. Id. at 162-76. 
121. ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE (2000). 
122. Id. at 18-24. 
123. Id. at 80. 
124. Id. at 81-89. 
125. See id. at 406-07; ESTLUND, supra note 98, at 162-76. 
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Workplace democracy of the future need not look precisely like 
workplace democracy of the past. Indeed, "flexibility and adaptability" 
are key features of the "collective bargaining model of industrial democ-
racy. "126 Some traditional unions have moved away from their democ-
ratic origins. 127 New or altered organizations may be necessary in lieu of, 
or in addition to, existing unions. The law should be structured to facili-
tate various forms of collective activity which will model and encourage 
democratic participation and build social ties among workers, both of 
which are important for American society. 
D. Summary 
For the three reasons set forth above, the collective system of 
workplace rights in a democratic society offers more promise for the fu-
ture than the individual system. The law of the workplace should be re-
visited with a view toward strengthening and encouraging the collective 
system, while still ensuring that minority interests 128 are represented. 
While the current NLRA can serve as a starting point for reviewing the 
system, a broader vision taking into account the changes in the work-
place since 1935 will help tailor the new collective system to the current 
conditions. Care must be taken to ensure true representative democracy, 
along with actual collective power. Neither the interests of business nor 
the interests of entrenched unions can dominate reform. Instead, the fo-
cus must be on creating a system that meets the goals of providing em-
ployee power, allowing employer flexibility, and assuring democratic 
participation in the workplace. 
VI. THE LABOR COURT 
A second reform, which could be undertaken with or without the 
one previously suggested, 129 directly addresses the problem of multiple 
tribunals for various labor and employment law claims. Many other in-
126. MIL TON DERBER, THE AMERICAN IDEA OF INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY, 1865-1965, at 534 
(1970). 
127. /d.at516-17,526. 
128. I use the term "minority" here in a broad sense to encompass any group whose interests 
are in a minority in the particular workplace. This would include racial, ethnic and gender groups 
when they have minority status in the workplace. 
129. If comprehensive law reform reduced the number of potential legal claims through greater 
emphasis on collective negotiation of employment terms, the number of legal issues would be re-
duced. Nevertheless, a unitary forum for decision on those claims could provide many of the same 
benefits produced by consolidation of the myriad of current claims into one tribunal. 
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dustrialized countries utilize specialized labor courts to resolve dis-
putes. 130 Several years ago, calls for creation of a single forum for en-
forcement of labor and employment law in the United States were com-
mon. Proponents of this procedural change cited the complexity and 
number of laws, and the enforcement by various agencies and in various 
forums. 131 Since these calls for change, which were most prominent in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s, the number of federal employment laws 
has increased substantially. 132 It is time to re-examine the case for crea-
tion of a United States labor and employment court. 
A specialized court would offer the advantage of judges with exten-
sive labor and employment expertise. 133 While the NLRA is adminis-
tered by a specialized tribunal, most other statutes are enforced through 
actions in federal and state courts, which have general jurisdiction and 
no particular experience in labor and employment law. 134 Indeed, these 
judges regularly decry the number of labor and employment cases that 
occupy their dockets. 135 An additional advantage of a specialized court is 
130. See Benjamin Aaron, The Administration of Justice in labor law: Arbitration and the 
Role of Courts: International Survey, 3 COMP. LAB. L.J. 3, 5 (1979-80). In some countries, how-
ever, the law distinguishes between individual and collective disputes and locates them in different 
tribunals. Id. at 11-13. See generally Alvin L. Goldman, Comparative Overview of the Role of Third 
Party Intervention in Resolving Interests Disputes, 10 COMP. LAB. L.J. 271 (1989) (discussing the 
role of labor courts in particular countries); Ian Holloway, The Constitutionalization of Employment 
Rights: A Comparative View, 14 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 113 (1993) (discussing the role of 
labor courts in particular countries). 
131. See Benjamin Aaron, labor Courts: Western European Models and Their Significance/or 
the United States, 16 UCLA L. REV. 847 (1969); Charles J. Morris, The Case/or Unitary Enforce-
ment of Federal labor law - Concerning a Specialized Article III Court and the Reorganization of 
Existing Agencies, 26 Sw. L.J. 471 (1972); see also Guy Farmer, Transfer of NLRB Jurisdiction 
over Unfair labor Practices to labor Courts, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 1 (1985); Joseph J. Shutkin, One 
Nation Indivisible - A Plea for a United States Court of Labor Relations, 20 LAB. L.J. 94 (1969). 
The Farmer and Shutkin articles rely primarily on criticism of the NLRB and identified problems 
with existing labor law to support calls for labor courts. I share some, but certainly not all, of the 
concerns of these authors, but neither focuses on the extensive law of individual rights in arguing 
for a labor court. 
132. E.g., Employee Polygraph Protection Act ("EPPA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2009 (2000) (en-
acted in 1988); Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act ("WARN"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 
2101-2109 (2000) (enacted in 1988); Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-
2654 (2000) (enacted in 1992); Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 
("HIPAA"), Pub. L. No. 104-191, I 10 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered Section of 29 
U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.). 
133. See Michael Mankes, Comment: Combatting Individual Employment Discrimination in 
the United States and Great Britain: A Novel Remedial Approach, 16 COMP. LAB. L.J. 67, 83 
(1994). 
134. See id. 
135. See generally Gregory Todd Jones, Testing/or Structural Change in legal Doctrine: An 
Empirical Look at the Plaintiff's Decision to Litigate Employment Disputes a Decade After the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 997, 1028 (2002) (noting that the federal docket is 
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that it would encourage representation by attorneys specializing in labor 
and employment law. Such attorneys may be more likely to seek reme-
dies and settlements that address broader workplace problems and the 
deeply embedded structures frustrating equal employment opportu-
nity. 136 
Consolidation of claims in one tribunal could reduce the problems 
resulting from conflicting claims decided by multiple courts and agen-
cies. All related claims could be heard in one proceeding, minimizing 
issues of res judicata and collateral estoppel. 137 A tribunal with broad ju-
risdiction and expertise could better accommodate overlapping and con-
flicting rights, remedies, and defenses because of its in-depth knowledge 
of relevant laws. Resources of all parties, courts, and relevant adminis-
trative agencies would be conserved by eliminating the need to litigate in 
several forums. 
In making a persuasive case for a unitary enforcement system in 
1972, Professor Charles Morris described the existing system as follows: 
The scene presented by the foregoing survey of enforcement problems 
besetting the nation's principal labor laws is one of confusion and frus-
tration. It is a picture of inefficient administration and inadequate com-
pliance; a jurisdictional nightmare of overlapping and conflicting deci-
sions. There exists a tableau of never-ending campaigns to achieve 
accommodation among separate tribunals with related but different ar-
eas of interest. 138 
Professor Morris recommended a constitutional court to decide 
cases, as well as consolidated government agencies, one for investiga-
tion and prosecution of claims under federal labor laws, 139 one for repre-
clogged by the increase in employment related litigation); see also J. Wilson Parker, Free Expres-
sion and the Function of the Jury, 65 B.U. L. REV. 483, 518 (1985) (indicating that Chief Judge 
Seitz of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit cited "employment cases as his 
primary example of unwarranted litigation currently clogging the federal dockets"). 
136. See Discrimination: Appeals Court Judge, Rights lawyers Recall Early Title Vil Years, 
Mixed Progress Record, 120 DAILY LAB. REP. A-5 (June 23, 2004) (paraphrasing EEOC Chairman 
William Brown (1969-1973) who commented about the increasing representation of plaintiffs by 
personal injury trial lawyers who are less likely to seek settlements addressing underlying issues). 
13 7. The extent to which such issues would remain would depend on whether future changes in 
the law allow consolidation of state and federal claims, and on the state of private dispute resolu-
tion. 
138. Charles J. Morris, The Case for Unitary Enforcement of Federal labor law - Concerning 
a Specialized Article Ill Court and the Reorganization of Existing Agencies, 26 Sw. L.J. 471, 495 
(1972). 
139. Id. at 498. Specifically, Professor Morris cited Title VII, the NLRA and the Railway La-
bor Act. Id. 
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sentation functions under the NLRA and the Railway Labor Act, and one 
for mediation. 140 While the changes that have occurred since 1972141 
warrant a careful look at the proposal to ascertain whether it appropri-
ately addresses changed circumstances, Professor Morris' thoughtful 
blueprint for a unified enforcement system provides a valuable starting 
point for consideration. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The two proposed reforms, alone or in tandem would enhance the 
possibility for achieving the underlying goal of Title VII, namely equal 
employment opportunity for people of all races, colors, genders, relig-
ions, and national origins. Consigning any portion of the responsibility 
for equal employment opportunity to employee collectives in 1964 
would have been unthinkable. While discrimination and unequal power 
between races, genders, and religious and ethnic groups persist, the 
changes that have occurred since 1964 make empowering employee col-
lectives to strive for employee rights and benefits a more realistic strat-
egy. As of 2004, Title VII has largely stalled in its efforts to make dra-
matic changes in the workplace. An alternative approach may re-ignite 
the fire for improving and eliminating workplace discrimination. 
Changing the law of the workplace is always a daunting task. The 
valuable and Herculean efforts of the Dunlop Commission appointed by 
President Clinton and composed of representatives from labor, manage-
ment, and government, did not lead to reform. 142 The interests are en-
trenched and powerful, and the resulting lobbying fervent. Many are in-
vested in the current system and fearful of change; change is unlikely to 
come about without increased recognition of the benefits of the collec-
140. Id. at 498-99. 
141. The rapid growth of alternative dispute resolution in the nonunion workplace and the 
additional statutory claims are two factors that must be taken into account in any proposal. In addi-
tion, the form of the new tribunal will have to be determined, whether an Article III court or some 
other adjudicative body. A final issue to be determined is whether to federalize some or all em-
ployment law claims and include them in the new tribunal's jurisdiction. If state law claims remain 
outside the tribunal's jurisdiction, some multiple forum problems would remain. Preemption issues 
would also remain, although clearly written federal preemption provisions could reduce litigation. 
See Summers, supra note 2, at 24-25. If state law were subsumed by federal, however, the creativity 
and experimentation in legal development that occurs at the state level could be stifled, perhaps re-
sulting in detrimental stultification oflabor and employment law. See id. at 24. 
142. See Dunlop Commission Report, supra note 98. The Commission was appointed by Presi-
dent Clinton to consider and make recommendations designed to "build more cooperative and pro-
ductive workplace relations." Id. at I 0. 
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tive system for employees and employers alike. I hope that this article 
will contribute in some small way to that recognition. 
Perhaps American individualism is simply at odds with the concept 
of collective representation. 143 The collective system was adopted during 
a time of great national stress due to depression and war, and substantial 
immigration from European countries with a stronger tradition of un-
ionization and collective action. Thus, it may be an historical anomaly, 
which cannot be revived in any significant regard. Any effort to structure 
a new collective system may be doomed to fail as well. If this is the 
case, I suspect that we will all be the worse for it. 
143. Befort, supra note 45, at 376-77. 
